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In a series of four experiments, Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) found support for
the conjecture that clockwise movements induce psychological states of temporal
progression and an orientation toward the future and novelty. Here we report the results
of a preregistered replication attempt of Experiment 2 from Topolinski and Sparenberg
(2012). Participants turned kitchen rolls either clockwise or counterclockwise while
answering items from a questionnaire assessing openness to experience. Data from
102 participants showed that the effect went slightly in the direction opposite to that
predicted by Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012), and a preregistered Bayes factor
hypothesis test revealed that the data were 10.76 times more likely under the null
hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis. Our findings illustrate the theoretical
importance and practical advantages of preregistered Bayes factor replication studies,
both for psychological science and for empirical work in general.
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Introduction
In a series of four experiments, Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) sought to demonstrate that
clockwise movements induce psychological states of temporal progression and an orientation
toward the future and novelty. For instance, participants in their Experiment 2 had to turn kitchen
rolls either clockwise or counterclockwise (see Figure 1); as the authors predicted, the results
showed that participants who turned the rolls clockwise reported more “openness to experience”
than those that turned the rolls counterclockwise.
Recently, however, Francis (2013, p. 162) subjected the Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) exper-
iments to a test for publication bias and concluded that “The probability of the experiment set is
low enough to conclude that the reported results appear inconsistent, which suggests that either
the experiments were not fully reported or were not run properly.” We believe it is important to
attempt and replicate the Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) results, for several reasons. First, the
eﬀect may strike many researchers as implausible – hence, additional independent strictly con-
ﬁrmatory replication is needed to establish the eﬀect more ﬁrmly (in case it exists). Second, the
publication test by Francis (2013) casts doubt on the veracity of the set of experiments – it is there-
fore important to address this emerging debate by empirical means. Third, the theory, experimental
design, and apparatus are simple and elegant; this is esthetically appealing and, in addition, the
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FIGURE 1 | The experimental setting: (A) the set-up; (B) the
instructions; (C) a close-up of one of the sealed paper towels; (D) the
schematic instructions; photos (E), and (F) give an idea of how a
participant performs the experiment. Figure available at:
https://www.flickr.com/photos/130759277@N05/, under CC license
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/.
straightforward nature of the hypothesis and the experiment
facilitates the design and analysis of a rigorous replication
attempt. Fourth, the Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) replica-
tion attempt allows us to highlight the advantages of preregistra-
tion in combination with Bayesian hypothesis tests.
In replication studies is it essential to be able to quantify evi-
dence in favor of the null hypothesis. In addition, it is desirable to
collect data until a point has been proven or disproven. Neither
desideratum can be accomplished within the framework of fre-
quentist statistics, and this is why our analysis of both experi-
ments will focus on hypothesis testing using the Bayes factor (e.g.,
Edwards et al., 1963; Berger and Mortera, 1999; Wagenmakers,
2007; Wagenmakers et al., 2012; Rouder et al., 2012). The method
section below provides the details of the proposed design and
analysis methodology.
Experiment
We sought to replicate Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012)
Experiment 2: the kitchen roll experiment. This research followed
a strictly conﬁrmatory protocol as described in Wagenmakers
et al. (2012) and advocated by De Groot et al. (1956/2014) and
Chambers (2013) – the preregistration form is available on the
Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/p3isc/. In line with
the stipulations of this Frontiers special issue, the preregistration
form was peer-reviewed and accepted before any data had been




A traditional frequentist analysis would start with an assess-
ment of eﬀect size followed by a power calculation that seeks
to determine the number of participants that yields a speciﬁc
probability for rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false.
This frequentist analysis plan is needlessly constraining and
potentially wasteful: the experiment cannot continue after the
planned number of participants has been tested, and it can-
not stop even when the data yield a compelling result earlier
than expected (e.g., Wagenmakers, 2007). We circumvented
these limitations by calculating and monitoring the Bayes fac-
tor (e.g., Edwards et al., 1963; Berger and Mortera, 1999; Rouder
et al., 2012; Wagenmakers et al., 2012). For the interpreta-
tion of evidence in the Bayesian paradigm, the intention with
which the data are collected is irrelevant; hence, the Bayes fac-
tor can be monitored as the data come in, and data collection
can be terminated at any point (Berger and Wolpert, 1988;
Rouder, 2014).
Based on the above considerations, our sampling plan was as
follows: we planned to collect data from a minimum of 20 par-
ticipants in each between-subject condition (i.e., the clockwise
and counterclockwise condition, for a minimum of 40 partic-
ipants in total). We were then planning to monitor the Bayes
factor and stop the experiment whenever the critical hypothesis
test (detailed below) reached a Bayes factor that can be con-
sidered “strong” evidence (Jeﬀreys, 1961); this means that the
Bayes factor is either of 10 in favor of the null hypothesis, or 10
in favor of the alternative hypothesis. We also planned to stop
the experiment whenever we reached the maximum number of
participants, which we set to 50 participants per condition (i.e.,
a maximum of 100 participants in total). Finally, we planned
to stop the experiment on October 1st, 2013. From a Bayesian
perspective the speciﬁcation of this sampling plan is needlessly
precise; we nevertheless felt the urge to be as complete as possible.
Intended Analyses
We planned to exclude from analysis those participants who
discerned the goal of the experiment (e.g., “the experiment is
about how personality changes due to turning kitchen rolls clock-
wise or counterclockwise”). The intended analysis proceeds as
in Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012): we planned to recode the
reverse items and then average the scores on the 12 openness to
experience items for each participant. Then we planned to use a
Bayesian hypothesis test to quantify the evidence for the hypoth-
esis that participants who turn the kitchen rolls clockwise report
1https://osf.io/8mpji/wiki/home/
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higher openness to experience than participants who turn the
rolls counterclockwise.
Speciﬁcally, we planned to assess this hypothesis by means of
a default Bayes factor for an unpaired, one-sided t-test as out-
lined in Rouder et al. (2009) and Wetzels et al. (2009). Bayes
factors quantify the support that the data provide for the null
hypothesis vis-a-vis the alternative hypothesis. Support in favor
of the alternative hypothesis constitutes support in favor of the
eﬀect reported by Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) in their
Experiment 2.
Deviations from OSF Preregistration Document
We deviated from the preregistration document in three aspects.
The ﬁrst aspect is that the preregistration document speciﬁed
that we would recruit “Psychology students from the University
of Amsterdam” (Wagenmakers et al., 2013). In practice, we did
not. People interested in participation could make an appoint-
ment via the UvA-participant website.2 It turned out that this
website is open to all UvA students (and not only psychology
students as we initially assumed). Therefore, students from other
academic ﬁelds also participated in the study. Also, seven par-
ticipants made an appointment on site and were not students.
As a result, our sample is more diverse compared to our ini-
tial sampling plan that only included UvA psychology students.
There does not appear to be a compelling explanation for why
the slightly more heterogeneous sample should materially change
the outcome of the experiment, and hence we analyzed the data
of all participants.
The second aspect in which we deviated from our pro-
tocol concerns the stopping rule; we planned to stop col-
lecting data after obtaining a Bayes factor of 10 in favor of
the null hypothesis, or 10 in favor of the alternative hypoth-
esis. As can be seen in Figure 2, we reached this crite-
rion several times before actually stopping. This occurred
because data had to be entered into the analysis by hand
and this made it more diﬃcult to monitor the Bayes factor
continually. In practice, the Bayes factor was checked every
2www.test.uva.nl
FIGURE 2 | The development of the Bayes factors for the comparison
of openness to experience between clockwise and counter-clockwise
rotation. The end result is based on 48 participants in the clockwise
condition and 54 participants in the counterclockwise condition. Figure
adjusted from JASP, jasp-stats.org.
few days. Thus, we continued data collection until we
reached our predetermined stopping criterion at the point of
checking.
The ﬁnal aspect in which we deviated from our pro-
tocol is that we tested 102 participants, which is more
than the 100 that were planned initially. This deviation
occurred because participants were randomly assigned
to conditions (i.e., by picking an envelope that con-
tained the number of their booth, see below). Hence, the
main criterion of a maximum number of 50 participants
per condition is not necessarily consistent with the sec-
ondary criterion of a maximum number of 100 participants
total, as was assumed in the preregistration document.
At the point of stopping, there were 48 participants in
the clockwise condition and 54 in the counterclockwise
condition.
Participants
As mentioned above, we recruited students from the University
of Amsterdam as well as non-students (people who walked in).
Participants were rewarded with course credits or a small mone-
tary reward.
Materials
We closely followed the materials section in Topolinski and
Sparenberg (2012; Experiment 2). Speciﬁcally, we used a short-
ened 12-item version of the openness to experience subscale of
the Neuroticism–Extroversion–Openness Personality Inventory
(NEO PI-R; Costa and McCrae, 1992), assessing a preference for
novel experiences and actions. An example item includes “I often
try new and foreign food.” As to-be-rotated objects, two ordinary
kitchen paper towels were sealed with plastic and slipped loosely
over upright wooden rods (see Figures 1A,B). Although this was
not speciﬁed by Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012), we also sealed
the bottom part of the paper towels, because this improved the
ease of rotation (see Figure 1C).
Both rods were ﬁxed on a wooden board, 50 cm apart, so
that the two paper towels could easily be manipulated using
both arms. The rotating direction was instructed non-verbally by
a schematic description (Figures 1D,E). The above description
copied Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) almost to the letter, the
only diﬀerence being that we used a translated, Dutch version of
the 12-item NEO PI-R (Hoekstra et al., 1996). Other instructions
with respect to the goal of the task and the turning of the kitchen
rolls were directly translated from those employed by Topolinski
and Sparenberg (2012) after Dr. Topolinski kindly provided us
with the materials.
Procedure
After signing an informed consent form, participants ﬁrst com-
pleted a set of unrelated tasks lasting approximately 30 min (e.g.,
completing an assessment form, doing a lexical decision task).
This setup was used on purpose, as it mimicked more closely the
design of Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012), where the kitchen
roll task was also presented following a battery of other, unrelated
tasks (this was pointed out to us by Dr. Topolinski).
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Next, we closely followed the procedures outlined by
Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012): participants were instructed
to continually rotate the two paper towels using the palms
of their hands (Figures 1D,E); this activity was practiced for
75 s, after which participants used the mouse to evaluate the
pleasantness and eﬀort of rotating the rolls. The experiment
then started: participants rotated the rolls while reading items
from the personality questionnaire, stopping to rotate only to
use the computer in order to complete the items. To reduce
across-participant variability in rotation times and consequently
increase the probability of ﬁnding an eﬀect, we implemented a
10-s rotation period preceding each question (this deviates from
Topolinski and Sparenberg, 2012, who did not implement such
a rotation period and responding was self-paced). Participants
used the mouse to render their ratings on a 5-point scale from
−2 (strongly disagree) to +2 (strongly agree). Then, participants
were asked to report their current mood (0 = very bad and
10 = very good) and arousal (0 = very relaxed and 10 = very
aroused/excited) while still rotating. Crucially, the turning direc-
tion of the paper towels was either clockwise or counterclockwise;
participants were assigned to each of these conditions in random
fashion.
As in Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012), all rating scales are
presented vertically (see Figure 1F). A minor design change with
respect to Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) is that, within each
condition of rotation, we counterbalanced the ordering of the
options: half of the participants saw the lowest-rated options at
the bottom of the screen, and half of the participants saw the
lowest-rated options at the top of the screen.
As in Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012), we attempted to
minimize the interaction between the participants and the exper-
imenter. Hence, participants completed the task in individ-
ual subject booths; the doors to the booths remained open
so that the experimenter could unobtrusively conﬁrm that the
participants were turning the rolls as instructed. Assignment
of participants to conditions was determined by the random
draw of an envelope that contained the number of the booth,
and occurred immediately prior to the participant entering the
booth. In case a participant was confused about the instructions
the experimenter brieﬂy provided clariﬁcation. After respond-
ing to the last item, a PC-directed funneled debrieﬁng probed




We excluded ﬁve participants who did not follow the experi-
mental procedure as intended: two of these participants rotated
two rolls in the opposite direction (e.g., with the left hand clock-
wise and with the right hand counter-clockwise), one participant
stopped rotating after the ﬁrst NEO-item, one participant misun-
derstood the instructions and tried to rotate the wooden sticks
instead of the rolls, and one participant expressed strong dissatis-
faction with the task (consequently, the experimenter decided to
stop the task halfway).
We included a total of 102 participants (77 females) in the
analysis, 48 in the clockwise condition and 54 in the counter-
clockwise condition. The mean age was 22.1 years (range 17–51)
and 93% (N = 95) participants were students.
Confirmatory Analysis
We recoded the reverse items (Cronbach’s α= 0.65, similar to the
value of α = 0.58 reported in Topolinski and Sparenberg, 2012)
and then averaged the scores on the 12 openness to experience
items for each participant. We used a one-sided Bayesian hypoth-
esis test (with a default Cauchy prior width of r = 1 for eﬀect
size on the alternative hypothesis, as speciﬁed by Rouder et al.,
2009 and Wetzels et al., 2009) to quantify the evidence for the
hypothesis that participants who turn the kitchen rolls clockwise
report higher openness to experience than participants who turn
them counterclockwise. The Bayes factor is BF01 = 10.76, indi-
cating that the observed data are 10.76 times more likely under
the null hypothesis that postulates the absence of the eﬀect than
under the alternative hypothesis that postulates the presence of
the eﬀect. According to the classiﬁcation scheme proposed by
Jeﬀreys (1961), this is strong evidence for the null hypothesis
that there is no diﬀerence on the NEO between people rotating
clockwise vs. counterclockwise. The mean score on the Openness
to Experience items was smaller in the clockwise condition
(Mean = 0.64, SD = 0.50, N = 48) than in the counterclockwise
condition (Mean= 0.71, SD= 0.47,N = 54); hence, the observed
eﬀect goes slightly in the direction opposite to that reported by
Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012).
Exploratory Analysis 1: Development of the
Bayes Factor
Figure 2 shows the development of the Bayes factor as a function
of the number of participants that were tested. Values of BF0+
greater than 1 indicate evidence in favor of the null hypothesis.
As the number of participants grows, the Bayes factor increas-
ingly supports the null hypothesis. It is of note that this Bayesian
sequential analysis requires no corrections – the Bayes factor can
simply be monitored as the data accumulate (e.g., Edwards et al.,
1963; Berger and Mortera, 1999; Wagenmakers et al., 2012).
Exploratory Analysis 2: Posterior
Distribution on Effect Size
Figure 3 shows the posterior distribution for eﬀect size (based
on a two-sided prior distribution). Most posterior mass is to
the left of zero, consistent with the fact that –in contrast
to Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012)– openness to experience
scores are lower in the clockwise condition than in the counter-
clockwise condition.
Exploratory Analysis 3: Assessing
Robustness
To examine the robustness of our conclusions, we varied the
shape of the prior for the eﬀect size under the alternative
hypothesis. Figure 4 shows the Bayes factor as a function of
the scale parameter r of the JZS Cauchy prior. The dot indi-
cates the result from the default prior used in the preregistered
data analysis (i.e., r = 1, as proposed by Jeﬀreys, 1961, and
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FIGURE 3 | Posterior distribution of effect size under a two-sided prior
distribution (Rouder et al., 2009). Most posterior mass is to the left of zero,
consistent with the fact that –in contrast to Topolinski and Sparenberg
(2012) – openness to experience scores are lower in the clockwise condition
than in the counterclockwise condition. Figure adjusted from JASP,
jasp-stats.org.
FIGURE 4 | Bayes factor as a function of the scale parameter r of the
Cauchy prior for effect size under the alternative hypothesis. Equal
variances are assumed. The dot indicates the result from the default prior.
Figure adjusted from JASP, jasp-stats.org.
Rouder et al., 2009). It is evident that, as the scale parame-
ter r increases (i.e., the prior becomes progressively wider), the
Bayes factor increasingly favors the null hypothesis. In addition,
it is evident that, even under the prior setting that most favors
the alternative hypothesis (i.e., scale parameter r very close to
zero), the Bayes factor is close to one, indicating ambiguous
evidence.
Exploratory Analyses 4: Additional Measures
The preregistration document reads: “As the original results
from Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) were not aﬀected
by the participants’ self-rated mood or arousal, we will
not incorporate these factors in our conﬁrmatory replica-
tion analysis (although we might present them later while
explicitly acknowledging their exploratory nature).” Here
we brieﬂy describe the eﬀects of the additional control
factors.
The control factors were pleasantness (“How pleasant did you
ﬁnd this task?”), eﬀort (“How much eﬀort did you invest in
this task?”), mood (“At this moment, you do you feel?”), and
arousal (“At this moment, how agitated are you?”). These fac-
tors were assessed by Likert scales ranging from 0 to 10. Table 1
shows the results separately for each condition. The two-sided
default JZS Bayes factors indicate evidence in favor of the null
hypothesis, with the exception of the “eﬀort” control factor, for
which the evidence is almost perfectly ambiguous; hence, these
Bayes factors provide little encouragement to put forward any
of these control factors as post-hoc explanations for our main
result.
Discussion
We were unable to replicate the ﬁnding reported by Topolinski
and Sparenberg (2012, Experiment 2). Based on data from
102 participants, our preregistered Bayes factor hypothe-
sis test revealed that the data were 10.76 times more
likely under the null hypothesis than under the alterna-
tive hypothesis. The observed eﬀect size was slightly nega-
tive, indicating that the eﬀect went in the direction oppo-
site to that predicted by Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012).
In sum, the results of our experiment do not support the
idea put forward by Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) that
clockwise movements induce psychological states of tempo-
ral progression and an orientation toward the future and
novelty.
We hope that future empirical eﬀorts in psychology and
other disciplines will increasingly use preregistered Bayes
factor hypothesis tests. By preregistering the analysis plan,
researchers prevent themselves from falling prey to their own
preconceptions and biases, mental distortions that can eas-
ily translate in a series of data-inspired hypothesis tests, only
a subset of which is presented to the reader. By conduct-
ing a Bayesian hypothesis test –something that can be eas-
ily accomplished using JASP3 (Love et al., 2015), a free
and open source graphical user interface for common sta-
tistical analyses– researchers can quantify and monitor evi-
dence in favor of the null hypothesis and the alternative
hypothesis.
3https://jasp-stats.org
TABLE 1 | Number of participants (N), mean and SD of openness to
experience, and the two-sided default Bayes factors for each of the four
control questions.
Condition N Mean score SD BF01
Pleasantness Clockwise 48 3.88 2.58 6.50
Counterclockwise 54 3.81 2.06
Effort Clockwise 48 3.60 2.37 0.98
Counterclockwise 54 4.56 2.37
Mood Clockwise 48 6.33 1.52 3.52
Counterclockwise 54 5.94 1.85
Arousal Clockwise 48 3.06 1.73 2.42
Counterclockwise 54 3.69 2.46
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In closing, we should stress that a single experiment cannot
overturn a large body of work. However, the strength of evi-
dence in our data is suﬃcient to change one’s prior beliefs by
an order of magnitude. An empirical debate is best organized
around a series of preregistered replications, and perhaps the
authors whose work we did not replicate will feel inspired to
conduct their own preregistered studies. In our opinion, sci-
ence is best served by ruthless theoretical and empirical critique,
such that the surviving ideas can be relied upon as the basis
for future endeavors. A strong anvil need not fear the ham-
mer, and accordingly we hope that preregistered replications
will soon become accepted as a vital component of a psy-
chological science that is both though-provoking and repro-
ducible.
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